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RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
WTO AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
GAO, Pengcheng*
I. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
A heated discussion about the relationship between the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and international human rights' has
lasted for a long period.2 The content covered under this topic is rich
* GAO, Pengcheng, MPhil Candidate in International Economic Law, City Uni-
versity of Hong Kong; LL.M in International and Comparative Law (Honors), Chi-
cago-Kent College of Law, IIT; LL.B, China University of Political Science and
Law, Beijing, China. Admitted to practice in China.
1 The term "international human rights" as used herein generally refers to rights
embedded in international agreements and documents, which come from regional
or purely domestic human rights issues and form a regime at a higher level,
though human rights ultimately is a profound national issue rather than interna-
tional one. For an elaboration of international human rights law, see generally
Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40(3) INT'L ORG.
599, 605-13, 616-17 (1986), available at https://www.classes.maxwell.syr.edu/
intlmgt/readings/donnellyhr.PDF.
2 The dispute exists not only in academia, but also among relevant international
organizations which are trying to clarify the relationship between the two. See
generally U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion
and Prot. of Human Rights, The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27,
2001), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/e06a5300f90f
a0238025668700518ca4/590516104e92e87bc1256aa8004a8191/$FILE/G0114345.
pdf; U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Globaliza-
tion and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, ElCN.4/2002/54
(Jan. 15, 2002), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/e06a5
300f90fa0238025668700518ca4/271bf943bbd7596fc1256b98004f2950/$FILE/GO21
0108.pdf; U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion
and Prot. of Human Rights, Liberalization of Trade In Services and Human
Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9 (June 25, 2002), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
HuridocdaHuridoca.nsfY0/32f8a4ad6cc5f9b9c1256c05002a87f8/$FILE/G0214114.
pdf; U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and
Prot. of Human Rights, Human Rights, Trade and Investment, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/
9 (July 2, 2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/e06a
5300f90fa0238025668700518ca4/9b2b4fed82c88ee2c1256d7b002e47da/$FILE/G03
14847.pdf. Various states also take different positions on the issue regarding the
incorporation of international human rights into the WTO. Even the same State
might have expressed contradictory views on this difficult issue over the years.
For instance, developing countries argue that the WTO regime should put more
energy into the development of the third world's human rights, while they also
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and comprehensive, but I believe it is rational to sum up the core is-
sues as follows for reaching the essence: (i) whether an intimate rela-
tionship can be established between the WTO rules and international
human rights (the "Possibility" Issue); (ii) if so, whether those human
rights considerations should be taken into account when analyzing
and interpreting the rules concerning trade under the WTO regime
(the "Ought to" Issue); (iii) how human rights will be legitimately
taken into consideration, and accordingly how they will affect the
WTO decision-making process or rule-establishment (the "How"
Issue)?
As is evident, the above introduction first involves the WTO as
the specific subject matter as it will be of primary significance. This is
because, theoretically, the WTO is the most ideal candidate to analyze
economic globalization and perhaps international rule of law in gen-
eral. Indeed, in practice the WTO has achieved great success and
played a predominant role in the international economic arena as
well.3 Second, this proposition is based on the ability of the WTO to
probe into situations where international human rights rules may ap-
pear with the potential to affect the WTO decision making or rule-
making. Such an arrangement was devised based on the belief that
international economic institutions such as the WTO have contributed
heavily to economic globalization of the international community in a
more fundamental way than international human rights considera-
tions alone.4
Generally speaking, freedom and equality operate as the fun-
damental principles of the WTO. Specifically, the direct objective of
the WTO, the promotion of free trade and equal transactions among
Members, was erected upon these tenets. This is immediately appar-
ent in the rules regarding the National Treatment (NT) and the most-
favored-nation treatment (MFN), which collectively demonstrate a
worry about the WTO's wide openness to human rights, since human rights cur-
rently are often utilized by developed countries as an excuse for intervention with
developing countries' economic or political affairs, a phenomena called 'politicizing
the WTO regime.' See Christine Breining-Kaufmann, The Legal Matrix of Human
Rights and Trade Law: State Obligations Versus Private Rights and Obligations,
in HuM. RTS. & INT'L TRADE 95 (Thomas Cottier et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Express
2005) (offering a brief introduction about proliferation and core issues of this
heated debate).
3 See generally Guiguo Wang, Globalising the Rule of Law, 48 INDIAN J. INT'L L.
21-45 (2008) (elucidating two prerequisites for economic globalization and center-
ing on the WTO to show its fitness for this mission).
4 See generally B.S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global
State in the Making, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 6-14 (2004) (proving the emergency of a
so-called "transnational capital" class and advocating the propriety of economic
needs).
2009] THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 399
spirit of non-discrimination. The importance of these two principles,
once located at the core of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
of 1947 (GATT 1947), is emphasized repeatedly throughout the entire
WTO regime, extending from the current Annex 1A (Multilateral
Agreements on Trade in Goods) of the Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization ("the WTO Agreement") to An-
nex 1B (the General Agreement on Trade in Services, "GATS") and
Annex 1C (the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of International
Property Rights, "TRIPS Agreement").5 Also as a generally accepted
view, freedom and equality are vital principles embedded in the foun-
dation of international human rights law.6 In this sense, we can reach
a preliminary conclusion that the WTO is based on principles which, to
some extent, provide the platform necessary for the human rights way
of thinking.
Concentrating on the academia, scholars are far from identical
in their approaches and attitudes.7 A large number of scholars seem-
ingly favor a view that the WTO regime has a basis of human rights
values,' especially economic human rights values.9 However, oppo-
nents consider such opinions imaginations and resist the comparison
5 The concept of MFN is included in the founding agreements of GATT, GATS,
and the WTO. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. I, Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/
legale/gatt47_e.pdf [hereinafter GATT]; General Agreement on Trade in Services
art. II, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, available at http://www.wto.orglenglishl
docs-e/legal-e/26-gats.pdf [hereinafter GATS]; Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 4, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M.
81, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement]. On the other hand, NT is included in Article II of GATT, Arti-
cle XVII of GATS, and Article 3 of the TRIPS Agreement.
6 See, e.g., U.N. Charter, preamble, arts. 55(c), 76(c)-76(d) available at http://
www.un.org/aboutun/charter/pdf/uncharter.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2009) [here-
inafter UN Charter]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts.
2(1), 26, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/
menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights art. 2(2) Dec. 16, 1966, 1966 U.S.T. 521, 993 U.N.T.S. 3,
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm [hereinafter
ICESCRI; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at arts 1, 2, 7,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), available at
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html [hereinafter UDHR].
7 For full-fledged literature review categorized by subject matter, see generally
WTO/HuMAN RIGHTS LITERATURE REVIEW (2005), available at http://www.law.
monash.edu.au/castancentre/projects/wtowto-lit-review-05.pdf (last visited Jan.
28, 2009).
8 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Conceptual Questions: Defining and Connecting the
Two Fields, in HUM. RTS. & INT'L TRADE, at 31-34 (offering an all-around descrip-
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to international human rights elements. 10 In practice, countries are
involved in heated debates as well, each holding its own attitude re-
spectively, subject to the defense of national interests."
The necessity discussion of the aforementioned type could be
endless and uncertain, especially considering the variety of viewpoints
and the existence of legitimate cons and pros. From my perspective,
neither simple support nor opposition to relative-establishment is ra-
tional. A comprehensive and systematic reexamination of this topic is
essential from both an theoretical and empirical point of view. 12 In
any event, the acceptance of international human rights elements is
not purely theoretical, or even imaginary. The relationship already
exists.
The crucial point, as I perceive it, is to find legitimate channels
for such kind of practices. Only in this can we prevent disguised activ-
ities on the one side and ensure a virtuous developing route on the
tion about human rights values and principles in international trade to show some
similarities).
9 For concluding remarks upon how WTO law reflects economic human rights val-
ues, see MO, Shi-jian, shi lun WTO he ren quan de ke xie tiao xing [Preliminary
Discussion on WTO and the Harmonization of Human Rights], 22 TRIB. POL. ScI.
& L. 22, 24-25 (2004). In addition, economic human rights values are argued to be
rational enough as part of human rights, though traditionally human rights are
often used in settings of political and civil freedoms. See Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, The WTO Constitution and Human Rights, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 19,
22-23 (2000).
10 See, e.g., ROBERT HOWSE & MAKAU MUTUA, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY: CHALLENGES FOR THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2000),
available at http://lic.law.ufl.edu/-hernandez/Trade/Howse.pdf (last visited Jan.
28, 2009); GLOBAL EXCHANGE, THE WTO ERODES HuMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS:
THREE CASE STUDIES (1999), available at http://www.globalexchange.org/cam
paigns/wto/CaseStudies.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2009); WTO Violates Interna-
tional Convention, MEIKLEJOHN CIVIL LIBERTIES INST., Dec. 2, 1999, available at
http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/apviol.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2009); Press Re-
lease from Alan R. Adaschik, The WTO versus Our Constitution and Fundamental
Human Rights, http://www.cephasministry.comlnwo-wto-gattletter-to-bush.
html (last visited Jan. 28, 2009).
11 For an exhibition of the struggle between rich and poor countries on this very
subject matter, see Padideh Ala'I, Symposium, A Human Rights Critique of the
WTO: Some Preliminary Observations, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 537, 537-42
(2001).
12 No matter whether or not one supports the idea that the WTO regime and in-
ternational human rights should be considered together, there have been several
cases that perfectly illustrate the relationship between the WTO regime and inter-
national human rights, although most are merely indirectly relevant and only
partly reflect the issue. Thus for practical reasons, a formal and mature system
should be established to tackle problems.
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other. Technical issues remain to achieve the goal of correct usage,
which is pertinent to furthering the WTO or rule of law in interna-
tional economic globalization, even the whole global order.
Bearing in mind these considerations, this article will first ex-
plore the potential hurdles for considering human rights elements
within the WTO. Such a succinct and overall generalization is not in-
tended to block the relationship between the two, but rather to exhibit
that the two ideas are distinguished in nature. This intends to pitch a
cautious key for the following, which coincides with the main idea of
this article: that developing such a relationship should be confined to
clear rules. In fact, the article will show in the following section that
the taking of international human rights into consideration under the
WTO is not meaningless. Indeed, existing hurdles already have been
partially removed so that possibilities exist for performing such kind of
activities. Consequently, the 'ought to' issue is somehow naturally ad-
dressed when the 'possibility' issue is no longer a problem. Further,
for the purpose of normative and reasonable operation, this article will
conduct an in-depth examination of possible measures that might fa-
cilitate the establishment of a relationship between the WTO and in-
ternational human rights values. Finally, this article expresses a
sincere desire to utilize the rule of law principle within the context of
globalization to standardize the use of international human rights con-
siderations under the WTO regime.
II. POTENTIAL HURDLES FOR CONSIDERING HUMAN
RIGHTS ELEMENTS UNDER THE WTO
A. Difference between Objects under Adjustment: Goods versus
People
Strictly speaking, the WTO does not incorporate genuinely
classic human rights, as scholars commonly interpret. Human rights,
according to the literal meaning, are rights which a human being is
entitled to; the regulations prescribed in the GATT 1994 are the
promises that Members guarantee to offer foreign goods. It is the very
reflection of the theory that trade is no more than an instrument, with-
out direct connections to ethnicity or human rights.' 3 In other words,
the WTO regime is merely a warranty on equal treatment to merchan-
dise from various sources, on whose platform each nation enjoys equal
opportunities to fair competition. In conclusion, the principles of non-
13 JoosT PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw: How
WTO LAw RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 73-74 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2003) (stating his opinion that the function of trade liberalization or
WTO rules is to increase the economic welfare of all States, while social and other
benefits are the results when States or private operators decide to grabble their
economic welfare).
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discrimination, freer trade, promotion of fair trade, and predictability
for the sake of stability, 14 all of which constitute the supporting pillars
of the WTO, are heading for the similar destination concerning the
treatment of goods.
B. Difference between Guiding Values: Equality of Opportunity
versus Fairness in Result
Human rights are always privileges that can only be truly ob-
tained by a specific person or a group (e.g. collective human rights).
They are benefits afforded to people. Consider a type of economic
human rights, for instance the right to education, which is available
and enjoyed when education is free, at least at the elementary and
fundamental stages.' 5 Also, the right to work is partially achieved
when one has the right to just and favorable conditions of work, to
protection against unemployment, and to equal pay for equal work. 1 6
In a word, human rights are concerning fairness in result.
However, what is included under the WTO regime is more akin
to equality of opportunity, which ensures that products transported
and exchanged can share the opportunity to be treated equally, such
as the amount of expenses and tariffs levied; the measures of imple-
mentation; applicable regulations and procedures; and any other bene-
fits, preferences, privileges, and exemptions.
More obviously, at the post-transaction stage, namely the dis-
tribution course, the result is out of arrangement with the WTO rules.
In reality, the WTO regime is limited in capacity to predict what con-
sequences it could bring to consumers or local people in the importing
countries and therefore avoid negative implications.' 7 There is no
mathematic equation or device under the WTO regime that would en-
sure a certain outcome given certain circumstances where the condi-
tions are satisfied. The fact that one country booms as a result does
not indicate or promise that other Members can also benefit respec-
tively. On the contrary, sometimes the higher degree of international
economic integration brought about by the WTO may act to undermine
a States' economy. Consider, for example, the situation in which im-
ports sweep into a country and consequently cause the local workers of
the relevant industry to be laid-off. Finally, the WTO regime sets only
a bottom line and merely cares about whether the goods could be ex-
14 See generally, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, TRADING INTO THE FUTURE: INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE WTO (2d ed. 2001), available at www.wto.org/english/res-e/
doloade / tif.pdf.15 UDHR, supra note 6, art. 26(1).
16 Id. art. 23(1)-23(2).
17 Generally speaking, the WTO regime is a rule-oriented or fixed-rule trading
regime, but not a result-oriented or fixed-quantity trading regime.
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changed in free circumstances. However, it leaves alone the kind of
life an individual may ultimately live.
C. Difference between Beneficiaries: Humans versus Corporation
Human rights literally refer to economic, political, and cultural
rights enjoyed by human beings. Human beings here of course are
natural persons," the definition of which excludes legal persons. 19
However, regarding international trade, multinational corpo-
rations may indirectly taste the fruit the WTO regime generates and
distributes to various goods. To be specific, transnational corporations
possess more properties and strength compared with individuals.
Such companies are able to claim rights, such as the right to effective
trade relief measures, when their products are unfairly treated or
when the collective interests of their industry are impaired. Since it is
transactional corporations that play a pivotal and active role as 'surf-
ers' in the intense competitions at the pre-transaction phase, i.e. the
production phase, the benefits coming from free trade do not amount
to human rights that an individual can actually enjoy. The transac-
tional companies, practically conducting business affairs as interna-
tional legal persons, might even not fulfill the basic living
requirements of workers through just payment proportional to the vol-
ume of work they supply, not to mention the favorable work conditions
or unemployment protection.20 In conclusion, the issue of real benefi-
ciaries places a big question mark on the possibility of incorporating
international human rights elements into the WTO regime.
18 Before World War II, and especially prior to World War I, human rights were
"almost universally viewed as the exclusive preserve of the State" (emphasis ad-
ded). After the War, with the emergence of the moral ground of international
human rights, a government's own citizens came to be viewed as the immediate
victims, who should be treated as the primary beneficiaries. See Donnelly, supra
note 1, at 614, 619. Additionally, "people" here include both individuals (pertinent
to individual rights) and a collective of persons (relevant to collective human
rights).
19 See generally UDHR, supra note 6 (alternatively using "human beings" and
"people").
20 This is why corporate responsibility is highlighted at the current time. See, e.g.,
Karin Lucke, States and Private Actors' Human Rights Obligations, HUM. RTS. &
INT'L TRADE 149-50, 157-62 (Thomas Cottier et al. eds., 2005); Larry Cati Backer,
Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: the United Nations' Norms on the
Responsibility of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social
Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 287 (2005).
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III. AN 'OUGHT TO' ISSUE AND DEVELOPMENT OF
PRACTICE FOR POSSIBILITIES
A. Failure of Comparative Advantage Theory: A Call for Human
Rights Supplementation
Economic hypothesis of comparative advantage once was, and
maybe is still, employed as a major justification to liberalize interna-
tional trade.21 In accordance with the theory, if free trade is realized
there will be a win-win consequence because every country can profit
from its own comparative advantages, even one that is absolutely dis-
advantageous.2 2 This belief strongly affects the WTO regime, acting
as rationale for its building and development.2 3
However, the theoretical hypothesis may be far from reality
since the trading environment may not be as ideal as the numerical
model presumes. 24 Situations vary from case to case.2 5 Evidence
21 The history of comparative advantage is really a long story. From 'absolute
advantage' in the Adam Smith's famous book THE WEALTH OF NATIONS to David
Ricardo's theory in his book THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION,
the theory has been gradually perfecting itself and developing into other new rele-
vant theories (like Factor Proportions Theory by Bertil Gotthard Ohlin in INTERRE-
GIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, Technological-gap Theory and Product Life
Circle Theory by R. Vernon in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN THE PRODUCT CYCLE). For a brief introduction see Steven Suranovic,
International Trade Theory and Policy: the Theory of Comparative Advantage -
Overview, available at http://internationalecon.convl./ch4O/40c000.html (last
visited Mar. 14, 2009).
22 Benefits from specialization and free trade can be gained since nations can en-
gage in activists that maximize their advantages and minimize their disadvan-
tages. This is well reflected in David Ricardo's numerical example on trade among
England and Portugal. A brief mathematical analysis is available at id. and http:l/
www.netmba.com/econ/micro/comparative-advantage/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
23 See, e.g., Understanding the WTO: Basics, The Case for Open Trade, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/theWT0_e/whatise/tif e/fact3_e.htm (last visited
Mar. 14, 2009) (emphasizing benefits from free trade and the principle of compara-
tive advantage as the ground).
24 Problems will arise from so many aspects. Although governments declare in
their announcements or put in their treaties the will for liberalism, their actions
may, at the end, deviate from that. The true intentions may vary from one state to
another and differ in manifestation so that we cannot tell accurately. However,
E.U. Petersmann gave his view, which can at least be regarded as a facial reflec-
tion of the purpose. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: INTERNA-
TIONAL AND DOMESTIC FOREIGN TRADE LAW AND FOREIGN TRADE AND FOREIGN
TRADE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND SWITZER-
LAND 112-20 (Univ. Press, Fribourg Switz. 1991).
25 Some have questioned current implementation of the theory of comparative ad-
vantages, especially in the world agricultural trade arena. See generally Carmen
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shows that the least-developed countries (LDCs) and the developing
countries do not catch up with the developing speed of developed coun-
tries. 26 Accordingly, the majority of wealth arising from international
economic exchanges goes into the pockets of the developed countries.
Comparatively, developing countries do not make substantial progress
economically but rather lag behind. The situation is essentially paral-
lel to the exploitation of developing countries by developed ones.
In this sense, it is doubtful that operation of the theoretic hy-
pothesis will lead to the expected result. The theoretically appealing
principle may be practically discouraging. This means the sound and
perfect blueprint planned by the WTO is not a guaranteed result. The
so-called equal opportunities ultimately are not equally available to
every individual country for the sake of differentiation in their grasp-
ing capacity. Therefore, there is a strong justification for taking inter-
national human rights into consideration for the WTO adjustment.
B. Development of Practice: Urgency for Rational Usage
The question regarding the necessity to build and maintain the
relationship between international human rights elements and the
G. Gonzalez, Deconstructing the Mythology of Free Trade: Critical Reflections on
Comparative Advantage, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 65 (2006) (employing "insights
from neoclassical and heterodox economics to critique the theory of comparative
advantage as applied to the agricultural sector by certain proponents of the ne-
oliberal economic model"). Even, concerning low labor standards, it has long been
blamed as one of those few comparative advantages achieved by developing coun-
tries. Though generally acknowledging that core labor standards can affect com-
parative advantage in unskilled labor-intensive goods, the author also discovers
that it may be empirically true for forced and child labor but not exact in situa-
tions regarding discrimination against females and strong union rights. See gen-
erally Matthias Busse, Do Labor Standards Affect Comparative Advantage in
Developing Countries? 30 WORLD DEV. 11, 1921-32 (2002).
26 One major reason why LDCs and developing countries cannot boom through the
WTO is that their capacity restrains their participation and their access to the
WTO mechanism. No matter how deliberately the blueprint is designed and modi-
fied, it is inadequate. See, e.g., Aileen Kwa, WTO and Developing Countries, 3
Foreign Pol'y in Focus 37, 37 (1998), available at http://www.fpif.org/pdf/vol3/
37ifwto.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2009) (numerating reasons why developing coun-
tries have little power within the WTO framework). In addition, though develop-
ing countries overall achieved an increase in market share regarding agricultural
exports (actually 2.3% in 5years is impressive), the WTO has to admit that some
individual countries even see their agricultural trade balance deteriorate. World
Trade Organization, Developing Countries, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/agric-e/negs-bkgrndl4_devopcount-e.htm (last visited Mar. 14,
2009). Moreover, by continuously broadening the adjusting scope of the WTO re-
gime, those few comparative advantages of developing countries are offset by their
disadvantages in new areas like IPRs.
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WTO way of thinking could certainly attract an array of distinct argu-
ments. Some may deem international human rights consideration as a
fresh breeze into the longstanding WTO framework. Moreover, the
warm caring for human rights has the capacity to alleviate the cold
blooded nature of capitalism. For example, members of the WTO once
discussed abandoning threats of sanctions against countries trying to
obtain medicines for health emergencies such as HIV/AIDS, mainly by
allowing them exceptions to patent rules as regulated by the TRIPS
Agreement for cases involving a national emergency or where a prod-
uct will have non-commercial uses.27
On the other side, human rights are, time and again, employed
by developed countries as excuses for new protectionism in various
manners 28or intervening political powers to escape the obligations
under the WTO. 29 Additionally, there are doubts about making the
WTO a backbone or juncture and the suitableness of the WTO to act as
an all-round persona. No matter if a country prefers it or not, non-
trade elements are gradually infiltrating the WTO regime. Members
are aware of the emerging influence of international human rights. In
this sense, the conundrum has already shifted from the question
whether we should incorporate human rights thinking into the WTO
regime to what are correct and appropriate ways of incorporating so as
to avoid new protectionism.
Considering that remaining a pure international trade regime
is impossible, it is urgent to answer the question of under what cir-
cumstances should we utilize human rights values and how much fur-
ther should we carry out the incorporation of human rights. Human
rights values should be an effective measure to alleviate and adjust
the negative result of incomplete and distorted performance of liberal
trade in form.
C. Emergence of Possibility: Achievements Already Gained
Theoretically, whether the WTO's approach is human-rights
based may still be a controversial issue.30 However, development of
WTO regulations and international trade practices, to some degree,
27 Statement of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIVIAIDS (UNAIDS) at
the Third WTO Ministerial Conference, at 2 (Seattle, Nov. 30 - Dec. 3, 1999).
28 Petersmann, supra note 24, at 100-12 (offering the characteristics of the new
protectionism).
29 Breining-Kaufmann, supra note 2, at 234 (stating that WTO members are re-
luctant to embrace a human rights approach to trade issues generally and then
giving an example of China to illustrate human rights approaches' nature of su-
perpower hegemony to third world countries).
30 See generally, Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human
Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann, 13 EuR. J. INT'L L. 815 (2002).
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overcomes technical problems concerning the possibility of carrying
out human rights reasoning under the WTO and hence places the'ought to' issue in a more insignificant position.
1. Changing of Beneficiaries and Objects under Adjustment
There are individuals who jointly participate in the transac-
tional trade,3 such as international service supply and international
licensing trade. Accordingly, individuals indirectly share free trade
profits.
More importantly, individuals even become direct beneficiaries
of personal rights under the WTO regime. Illustratively, personal
rights find its place in the TRIPS Agreement3 2 and the GATS ex-
presses concerns for individuals in some circumstances.3 3 With regard
to protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs), the TRIPS Agree-
ment stipulates that any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity
granted by a Member to its citizens shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to those citizens of other Members.3 4 In the GATS,
besides services per se, service suppliers are granted rights as well.3 5
Compared with GATT 1947, the areas concerning IPRs, trade in ser-
vices and trade-related investment measures are all new to the WTO
framework. Therefore, we can say that the WTO has already made
progress by striving to secure tenure of properties and therefore show-
31 In the author's opinion, compared to the participation of transactional corpora-
tions, the portion of individual actors in the international trade market is still
restrained. The WTO regime is originally made for economic benefits of each and
every state (emphasis added). Hardly can individuals truly and directly taste the
fruit of international human rights' care. As there are only a minority of individu-
als in international goods dealings (c.f. GATT 1947, which centers on goods, is
more concerned about goods' flowing and merely affords indirectly rights to
merchants). And also, a host of companies take part in areas like intellectual
property rights (IPRs) and service dealings. For instance, transactional corpora-
tions have a great deal of money and labor in exploiting new products with IPRs,
like drugs to cure diseases and agricultural implements necessary for farming.
Also, service companies play a major role in the service market. Accordingly, step
by step, individuals lost their independent status in the whole international trade
market, and gradually become members in the transactional corporations. As a
majority of them come from developed countries, the question is turned into one
regarding the competition between the North and South.
32 The reason to say so is because IPRs are deemed as private rights. See TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 5, preamble. From my perspective, the TRIPS Agreement
is special for the sake that it actually concerns more about private rights, unlike
the goods-focusing attitude of the GATT 1947.
33 See, e.g. GATS, supra note 5, Art. XIV (c)(ii).
34 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5, Art. 3.1.
35 GATS, supra note 5, Art. 2.1.
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ing care for human rights and respect for dignity of IPRs owners, ser-
vice suppliers and investors.
2. Devices Established concerning Caring for Fairness in Result
A set of principles has been established and made available for
each and every Member to achieve fairness. In the preamble of the
WTO Agreement, it explicitly sets the objective to "raise standards of
living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing vol-
ume of real income and effective demand," which remains identical
with GATT 1947 in literature. 36 More importantly, to ensure 'sustain-
able development' the WTO adds, "in a manner consistent with their
respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic develop-
ment (emphasis added)."3 7 It is a manifestation of the respective ne-
cessity of development of each state under the WTO regime. In this
sense, the principles above respectively may have a international
human rights base, such as the enjoyment of an adequate standard of
living and just and favorable working conditions.
Compared with the preamble of GATT 1947, nearly all the
statements in the WTO preamble remain exactly the same. There is
one exception. The WTO preamble saves a whole paragraph declaring
promotion of economic development of developing countries, especially
including caring for LDCs.3 8 Actually, concerns for developing coun-
tries are deliberately complemented and underscored throughout the
whole WTO regime: not only in the preamble of the WTO Agreement
but also in preambles of other covered agreements and even in special
arrangements. 3 9 Since the WTO regime is formed on bilateral negotia-
tions among states and therefore more state-centered than individual-
36 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, pmbl, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994) [hereinafter Final
Act].
37 Id.
38 The preamble states: "Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts
designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed
among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate
with the needs of their economic development." Final Act, supra note 36, pream-
ble. On the other side, economic development is another major difference between
GATT 1947 and the WTO, which is not within the subject of this paper. It is about
protection for sustainable development and optimal use of resources in manners
consistent with concerns at different levels.
39 For instance, the preamble of the TRIPS Agreement states: "Recognizing also
the special needs of the least-developed country Members in respect of maximum
flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws and regulations in order to en-
able them to create a sound and viable technological base". TRIPS Agreement,
supra note 5, pmbl.
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centered, it is suitable to view this principle as a reflection of human
rights development.4 °
On one side, we cannot overestimate the function of preambles
under the WTO regime. It is agreed that the general meaning of terms
in the treaty should be interpreted in context and in accordance with
the objective and purpose;4 1 preambles and annexes are included in
the context,42 which in turn mirror the objective and purpose as ele-
ments to determine the ordinary meaning of a treaty.4 3 Although the
objective way of interpretation is excessively and improperly utilized
once in the international adjudicating practice,4 4 the purpose has
never been an element in the first place to be taken into account by
WTO panels and the Appellate Body (AB).4 5 Considering the WTO ad-
judicating bodies' rule-oriented attitude, we have to regretfully admit
that most of the time the preamble only serves as a goal to realize and
a guideline for future negotiations and endeavors.
On the other side, since a majority of third world countries won
their independence and withdrew their support by the 1990s, they, in
union, represent a strong force to claim and fight for their national
rights. Generally, they have collective desire both in politics and eco-
nomics as a majority of Members in the WTO are developing countries.
Accordingly, the strong voice for development and complete participa-
tion in multilateral liberalization of trade and globalization has been
active. Further, although the WTO is sometimes blamed by some com-
mentators for bringing along nothing but poverty and exploitation to
developing countries, the WTO has truly paid increasing attention to
developmental issues. It realizes that developing countries and LDCs
40 Robert D. Anderson & Hannu Wager, Human Rights, Development and the
WTO: the Cases of Intellectual Property and Competition Policy, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L.
707, 708 (2006) (arguing that rules of multilateral trading system are "a necessary
response to the dilemmas of globalization and contribute to, rather than hinder,
the fulfillment of human rights" and play an important role as "tools of develop-
ment and, therefore, instruments for the advancement of human rights"). At the
same time, I also recognize the existence of human rights concerns for individuals
in the TRIPS Agreement. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 5.
41 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [hereinafter VCLT] (May 23, 1969),
art. 31.1, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conven
tions/1_1_1969.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
42 Id. art. 31.2.
43 Id. art. 31.1.
4' GYORGY HARASZTI, SOME FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF THE LAW OF TREATIES
113-15 (Akaddmiai Kiad6 Budapest, 1973).
5 Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R,
WT/DS10/AB/R, WTfDS11/ABJR, at 11 n.20 (Oct. 4, 1996) (stating that "the
treaty's 'object and purpose' is to be referred to in determining the meaning of the
'terms of the treaty' and not as an independent basis for interpretation").
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are more vulnerable to the negative effect of globalization,4 6 and in
various scenarios it emphasizes time and again that the issue of devel-
oping countries has and will still be one of the apparent characteristics
in the WTO arena.4 7 In conclusion, we should admit that the WTO
regime is keeping an eye on the remainder of haunting poverty and
diseases in developing countries, stepping much deeper into human
rights than its antecedent, the GATT.
IV. MEASURES TO TAKE HUMAN RIGHTS INTO
CONSIDERATION
It is generally accepted that the WTO regime is part of the
corpus of international public law, though it mainly deals with issues
arising from international business.48 Therefore, the WTO regime
should be put into the system of international laws as a whole.4 9 In
this sense, it seems that establishing the relationship between the
WTO and international human rights is hopeful.
Centering on the WTO regime, the current international
human rights rules can be related to the WTO in two measures: one is
through indication from clauses or terms or standards in the WTO on
the basis of interpretation by WTO adjudicating bodies or the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB); the other way is derived from the situation
where the same country assumes conflicting responsibilities and
rights. Each channel should be explored in a cautious manner.
A. Linkage Indicators and Interpretation Issues
The WTO regime is not an isolated or enclosed system, but one
that reaches out to the whole of international public law. In this
46 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 Nov. 2001 WT/
MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 3 (2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
thewtoe/minist_e/min0l_e/mindecl-e.pdf (recognizing the particular vulnerabil-
ity of LDCs).
47 Id. (expressly declaring its commitment to address "the marginalization of
least-developed countries in international trade and to improving their effective
participation in the multilateral trading system [especially to] secure beneficial
and meaningful integration into the multilateral trading system and the global
economy").
48 Actually, the word 'public' is not a synonym of politics; and the traditional scope
of international law focusing on national affairs has been amended and extended
to a broader arena such as transactional trade here.
49 See e.g., The Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation
of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion
of International Law, [2006] U.N. Doc. A/61/10, available at http:/untreaty.un.org/
ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/l-9-2006.pdf. Since International
Law Commission (ILC) documents are often quoted by WTO's adjudicating bodies
in their reports, their importance is beyond doubt.
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sense, the relationship between the WTO and international human
rights is not imaginative or artificially created, but realistically rooted
in agreements. To be specific, one should find the 'linkage indicators'
to establish the relationship with international human rights. The in-
dicators may be a term, a rule, or any clause in WTO agreements that
refers to or directs to international human rights rules or values.
By means of interpretation, those ambiguous norms and stan-
dards in the WTO can in this way be clarified to form a stable and
concrete platform for taking international human rights into consider-
ation. The indicators accordingly provide clues to specific interna-
tional human rights rules or to considerations of general international
human rights values. The human rights rules and principles referred
to are not part of the WTO regime but something outside of it. Viewed
from another way, international human rights rules and standards
containing value considerations are de facto employed to assist the in-
terpretation of those general and ambiguous regulations in the WTO.
Therefore, the issue can finally be transformed into a matter of inter-
pretation under the WTO regime.
1. Conceptual Indicators and International Human Rights Rules
Conceptual indicators refer to exceptional rules under the
WTO regime. The exceptional rules exist throughout WTO agree-
ments, including 'generally exceptions,' and a multitude of other cate-
gories of exceptional rules that may also take human rights into
consideration.' 0
50 These exceptions may or may not use the word "exception" in their description.
In substance they are indeed exceptions to certain obligations under the WTO re-
gime. For example, as to Article XI: 2(a) ("General Elimination of Quantitative
Restrictions") of GATT 1947, export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily are
permitted to "prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products
essential to the exporting contracting party", GATT, supra note 5 art. 2(a), which
may be in indirect relationship with the article 11.1 ICESCR as to rights of "an
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food".
ICESCR, supra note 6, art. 11.1. Also, Article 27.2 ("Patentable Subject Matter")
excludes inventions from patentability as long as such exclusion is "necessary to
protect ordre public or morality, including to protect Human . . .life or health."
GATT, supra note 5, art. 27.2. In addition, some scholars also acknowledge the
uncertainty for connections through exceptions. See Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dis-
pute Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 753, 789 n.115 (2002) (stat-
ing, "[clan the interpretation of GATT Article XXI(b)(iii) 'emergency in
international relations' remain impermeable to the evolution of the concept of
'threat to peace and security' in general international law authorizing the use of
force and other Chapter VII measures by the Security Council and individual
states when faced with a crisis and massive violations of human rights taking
place entirely in another state?").
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The conceptual indicators are shown as follows:5 (i) necessary
to protect public morals or to maintain public order;5 2 and (ii) neces-
sary to protect human life or health. 53 Generally speaking, to estab-
lish the relationship with international human rights is to determine
the meaning of these indicators at first and to find out which kind of
international human rights norms can subsequently be employed for
interpreting these indicators. As we will see below, the relationship
established on account of these indicators still requires examination
and there is an array of issues.
Above all, reflected from numerations above, WTO provisions
use terms with ambiguous meanings. If the meaning of those indica-
tors cannot be accurately determined, any suspicious international
human rights rules can arguably or even arbitrarily be included or ex-
cluded. Take the US - Gambling and Betting case for instance (the
51 Numeration of general exceptions is not definite, since there are certainly other
specific links to human rights concerns, whose meaning does not require much
discussion. See High Commission for Human Rights, Human Rights and World
Trade Agreements: Using General Exception Clauses to Protect Human Rights, HR/
PUB/05/5, at 4 (2005), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
WTOen.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2009) (stating that "[t]hree of the general excep-
tions could be applicable to a broader range of human rights concerns," while"others are so closely linked to specific human rights that there is little reason to
discuss their content in detail"); see generally, id. at 4 n.21 (discussing various
other human rights documents).
52 Article XIV (b) of the GATS, GATS, supra note 5, art. 14(b), is similar to clause
(a) of Article XX of the GATT, GATT, supra note 5, art. 20, titled 'General Excep-
tions', in spite of adding the exception to maintain public order. Public morals are
not clearly referred to as human rights in ICCPR, but seemingly as another differ-
ent consideration restricting certain types of human rights. See Larry Ogalthorpe
Gostin & Zita Lazzarini, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE AIDS PAN-
DEMIC 6 (Oxford Univ. Press 1997). Even so, considering the general meaning of
two terms, an abundance of scholars argue that "internationally recognized
human rights articulate elements of international public morality and come
within the ordinary meaning of 'public morals'" and therefore "conception of public
morals or morality that excluded notions of fundamental rights would simply be
contrary to the ordinary contemporary meaning of the concept." See Robert
Howse, Back to Court after Shrimp/Turtle? Almost But Not Quite Yet: India's
Short Lived Challenge to Labor and Environmental Exceptions in the European
Union's Generalized System of Preferences, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1333, 1368
(2003); Human Rights and World Trade Agreements: Using General Exception
Clauses to Protect Human Rights, supra note 51, at n. 24. This same logic can be
applied to "public order".
53 GATT, supra note 5, art. XX(b); GATS, supra note 5, art. XIV(b) (the former two
have exactly the same expressions).
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first case regarding interpretation of 'public moral or public order')., 4
The panel found the notion of "public moral and public order" in the
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 2002,11 together with reading foot-
note 5 clarified by the drafters of the GATS,56 which were finally con-
firmed by the appellate body.57 Depending on the panel's reliance on
the supplementary means of interpretation, 58 we could draw a conclu-
sion that public moral or/and public order is/are unspecified still.59
Even worse, "public moral" is not deemed as an established concept in
international law.60 In conclusion, the meaning of general exceptions
in the WTO is far away from definite and stable, which leaves space
for evolution. It should be gradually specified and clarified by WTO
adjudicating bodies and the DSB. Otherwise, related international
human rights norms will stay uncertain depending on the expanded or
limited content of the indicators.
Furthermore, setting aside the meaning of indicators, the ques-
tion about which types of international human rights rules are legiti-
mately available in the waiting list is also under heated dispute. Can
international human rights rules coming into existence long after the
WTO establishment be employed as an interpreting device or mean-
ing-determiner of those indicators? Can international human rights
rules involving limited or different parties be utilized to interpret
WTO agreements that have a much wider scope of memberships?
The first question actually concerns whether there are tempo-
ral requirements as to applicable rules outside the WTO regime for
interpretation of WTO rules. To be specific, some may doubt whether
it is suitable to employ lex posterior as a supportive interpretation of
lex prior, since it could be detrimental to legislative intentions of lex
prior established before. Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT does not provide
any restriction concerning the temporal element of applicable rules
54 United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and
Betting Services [hereinafter US-Gambling and Betting], Appellate Body Report,
WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005).
55 US-Gambling and Betting, Panel Report, WT/DS285/R, at 237 n. 906 & 907
(Nov. 10, 2004). It could be deemed as a reference to the evolutionary meaning in
the current file (2002).
56 Id. at [ 6.467.
67 US-Gambling and Betting, Appellate Body Report, supra note 54, 296-99.
58 US-Gambling and Betting, Panel Report, supra note 55, 6.470-6.473.
59 It should be read with VCLT 32: "Recourse may be had to supplementary
means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the cir-
cumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the
application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation ac-
cording to article 31:(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure;. .. " See VCLT,
supra note 41, art. 32.
60 Breining-Kaufmann, supra note 2, at 107.
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outside the WTO law for interpretation. 61 However, its original text
mentioned "rules of international law in force at the time of conclusion
of the treaty."62 That means, as it was drafted, the provision only al-
lowed for reference to rules of the international law that existed at the
time of conclusion.63 On the other side, the International Court of Jus-
tice (ICJ) itself has changed its attitude in its 1966 draft64 and also
makes some evolutionary interpretations when confronting specific
cases.6" As for the WTO practice, in US - Shrimp case, the appellate
body perceived the generic term "natural resources" as "by definition,
evolutionary" rather than "'static' in its content or reference."6 6 All
the above examples clearly show conflicts between the contemporane-
ous principle and evolutionary approach when conducting treaty inter-
pretation. Then, the question will arise as to which will be the most
suitable methodology for interpretation of the specific WTO provision
that may lead to connection with human right norms. From my per-
spective, there is no explicit inhibition of abandoning the temporal
rule. Availability of lex posterior is normally indicated by the general
principle as to interpret the term in good faith. 7 In other words, rele-
61 See VCLT, supra note 41, art. 31(3)(c) (stating "any relevant rules of interna-
tional law applicable in the relations between the parties").
62 See Waldock Report III, art. 70.1(b) quoted in CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW: How WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 13, at 264 n.76.
63 Paragraph 1 of the text provisionally adopted in 1964 stated that the ordinary
meaning given to terms of a treaty is to be determined "in the light of the general
rules of international law in force at the time of its conclusion." See Commentary
on 2 7(16), section 3: Interpretation of treaties, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties
with commentaries 1966 Y.B. INT'L LAW 222 (1966).
64 Paragraph 3(c) of the 1966 draft, which is same with current VCLT, reads: "any
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties."
VCLT, supra note 41, art. 3(c). Actually in the preparation of VCLT itself, it was
realized that "the content of a word, e.g. 'bay' or 'territorial waters,' may change
with the evolution of law if the parties used it in the treaty as a general concept
and not as a word of fixed content." PAUWELYN, supra note 13, at 266.
65 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276,
ICJ Advisory Opinion, at 31 (June 21, 1971) (stating that where concepts embod-
ied in a treaty are "by definition evolutionary," their "interpretation cannot remain
unaffected by the subsequent development of law ... Moreover, an international
instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire
legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation.") See also Aegean Sea
Continental Shelf Case (Greece u. Turkey), ICJ Judgment, at 3 (Dec. 19, 1978).
66 United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products
[hereinafter U.S. Shrimp], Appellate Body Report, WT/DS58/AB/R, T 130 (Oct.
12, 1998).
67 See Commentary, supra note 63.
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vance of rules of international law for interpretation of treaties in any
given case was ultimately dependent on the intention of the parties.6"
Specifically, some norms of the WTO were "actually crafted more than
50 years ago", which "must be read by a treaty interpreter in the light
of contemporary concerns of the community of nations" about the pro-
tection and conservation of human rights.6 9 It is, therefore, even ra-
tional to assume these terms are originally intended by the drafters to
be open and general in meanings. Interpreting WTO rules thus seem-
ingly should not be too restrained by temporal requirements.
As for the second question, it is about whether there are mem-
bership requirements as to applicable rules outside the WTO regime
for interpretation of WTO rules. Some may oppugn the appropriate-
ness to employ the rules drafted by parties other than members of the
WTO to interpret WTO rules, since it could be seemingly absurd to
invoke intentions of say nation A, B and C to speculate intentions of
nation A, D, E and F. However, the VCLT Article 31(3)(c) does not
settle down the specific scope of the parties, between whom relevant
rules could be applicable in interpretation. From my perspective, the
strict interpretation of the treaty among all Members of the WTO
seems unfavorable. Actually, few international treaties have exactly
the same or even identical membership, let alone the WTO, consider-
ing the expanding tendency of WTO's Member numbers accompanying
the trend of globalization.7 ° In addition, the WTO even accepts non-
sovereignty members. 7 ' The issue of membership is a crucial point to
interpretation, since it is closely pertinent to the central issue of to
what extent international human rights norms could be utilized as
supportive instruments for WTO interpretation (i.e. refreshing WTO
norms via human rights concerns). However, practices of WTO adjudi-
cating bodies seem not to coincide on this matter.7 2 In conclusion, it
may still be uncertain exactly how intimate international human
rights relate to WTO rules.
In sum, since a host of terms under the WTO regime are often
ambiguous and unspecified, and there is still no case regarding human
rights consideration through interpretation of exceptions, it is really
68 Id.
69 U.S. - Shrimp, supra note 66, 129.
70 When Cape Verde joined the WTO on July 23, 2008, the organization's member-
ship rose to 153. WTO.org, 2008 News Items, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/
news08_e/acc-capverdejulyO8-e.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
71 See Marceau, supra note 50, at 783-84.
72 In U.S. - Shrimp, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Spe-
cies of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and other multilateral environmental agree-
ments which did not have the same membership as WTO were employed as means
for interpreting the term "exhaustible natural resources". U.S.-Shrimp, supra
note 66, at 8, 19, & 37.
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tough to tell exactly how much leeway is left for international human
rights to be considered in the WTO regime. Some scholars and com-
mentators hold rather optimistic views.7 3 According to them, since ex-
ceptions evolve with time proceeding and no contrasting evidences in
practice show repellence to international human rights invasion, we
can gradually introduce human rights in a flexible way.
2. Standard Indicators and International Human Rights Values
There are also standard indicators under the WTO regime, spe-
cifically in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agree-
ment) and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement (SPS Agreement).7 4 Standard in-
dicators exist since rules of the WTO prescribe that the sanitary,
phytosanitary and technical measures of Members will be examined
for compliance with standards made by other international organiza-
tions. Though international standards may not be part of interna-
tional human rights law,7 5 the WTO's relationship with international
human rights can still objectively exist. In fact, the SPS and TBT
Agreement underscore obeying international standards, which accord-
73 See generally, Human Rights and World Trade Agreements: Using General Ex-
ception Clauses to Protect Human Rights, supra note 51, at 9 (stating that, "[T]he
term 'public morals' could arguably include human rights (recognized in interna-
tional human rights treaties with broad membership and reflecting fundamental
values) within its scope.").
74 See, e.g., Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures, Annex A, 3, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
SPS Agreement] (explicitly referring to food safety, standards, guidelines and rec-
ommendations established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), that of
animal health by the International Office of Epizootics (IOE) and that of plant
health by the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC)); see also Panel
Report, European Communities - Trade Description of Sardines, 7.63, WT/
DS231R (May 29, 2002) [hereinafter EC - Sardines] ("[Ijnternational standards
are standards that are developed by international bodies."). The TBT Agreement
has a wider range of standards to refer to than the SPS Agreement.
75 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Annex 1:2, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter TBT Agreement] available at http://www.wto.org/englishldocs-e/
legal-e/17-tbt.pdf. The standards denote to some documents with which compli-
ance is not mandatory. However, most of international human rights existing and
followed by are compulsory in the treaty form and usually legally binding (though
some exceptions exist, as UDHR is more like declaration or gentleman agreement
without compulsory effect). Factually, the WTO regime has in the end turned
standards into legally binding in force since the TBT agreement conformity is pre-
sumed once compliance with international standards is achieved. Id. at art. 2.5.
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ingly serves to protect human health and other important values.7 6 In
this way, the adoption of standards indirectly involves human rights
consideration and determination of standard level concerns with bal-
ance between human rights protection and free trade.7" Indeed,
human rights considerations appear to have already been utilized as
legitimacy for higher standards of protection in the SPS and TBT
agreement.78
Conceptual indicators refer to international human rights
which will exempt trade responsibilities of a country. In this sense,
international human rights and trade responsibilities rules play re-
versed roles. However, in the situation regarding standard indicators,
specific standards applied are legitimatized by international human
rights considerations. That is to say, the stronger the desire for inter-
national human rights values is, the more severe trade obligations will
be. In this way, international human rights values and trade responsi-
bilities rules function in the same direction.
At this circumstance, because of financial difficulties and back-
ward techniques, the higher standards and accompanying human
rights legitimacy are always proclaimed by developed countries
against developing ones.7 9 Therefore, the international community is
76 See SPS Agreement, supra note 74, at art. 2.2 ("Members shall ensure that any
sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent necessary to pro-
tect human, animal or plant life or health .... ."); see also Alan 0. Sykes, Regula-
tory Competition or Regulatory Harmonization? A Silly Question? 3 J. INT'L ECON.
L. 257, 257-64 (2000) (discussing avoidance of rent-seeking behavior from domes-
tic law lobbies to guarantee a certain degree of cooperation).
77 Robert Howse & Makau Mutua, Protecting Human Rights In A Global Econ-
omy: Challenges For The World Trade Organization, RTS. & DEMOCRACY, Jan.
2000, at 20, available at http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/
globalization/wtoRightsGlob.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2009) (narrating opinions
by some trade experts that there is a balancing or proportionality test under the
SPS and TBT Agreements and additionally purports that WTO adjudicating bod-
ies seem to "prefer an interpretative approach which recognizes that the social
responsibilities of governments should not be lightly interfered with by trade
law").
78 For instance, the Hormones case seems to support the view that "threshold
should not be set in a way that frustrates the ability of governments to meet their
responsibilities to protect their citizens." Id. It allows for a higher level of protec-
tion based on divergent view of scientific opinion; and such views are especially
supported if "where the risk involved is life threatening in character and is per-
ceived to constitute a clear and imminent threat to public health and safety." See
Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones), 194, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan.16, 1998).
79 See e.g., Pengcheng GAO, China, the U.S., and the Food Safety under the WTO
Regime, 17 INT'L TRADE L.J. 13-30 (2008) (showing that the U.S. as a developed
country racks its brains to find a legitimate stand under the WTO to accuse lower
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more concerned about whether human rights considerations are
abused, since human rights level cannot be arbitrarily lifted. Other-
wise, it will finally undermine free trade and therefore harm economic
rights of developing countries.
Since there is a legal presumption on the function of interna-
tional standards against any claim for deviation from WTO obligations
and WTO adjudicating bodies refuse to give any consideration of trans-
parency, due process and other procedure qualities of international
standards, 0 the WTO's heavy reliance on international standards is
quite worrisome. Actually, we cannot really tell how a non-govern-
mental body makes standards.8 ' Compared with the WTO, other in-
ternational organizations may consist of fewer members or even be
dominated by one or a minority of nations. There is reasonable doubt
as to whether standards will or will not turn out to be voices of only a
few states.
Further, it seems unreasonable considering that WTO mem-
bers may not be parties of those non-governmental bodies but they can
or must follow international standards. Although in some circum-
stances international standards in the SPS Agreement may not be the
only enforceable standards and the last resort,8 2 one still cannot deny
that reliance on the non-governmental bodies is too heavy. In conclu-
sion, standard indicators may be dangerous conductions under the slo-
gan of international human rights consideration and are inclined to
become a disguise for hegemony, since bars of standards could be
raised to an unforeseeable level and impose excessively harsh restric-
tions under the WTO regime.
standards; while China as a developing country notices its lag in food science and
technology and strives to resolve the problem).
80 Human Rights in the WTO Dispute Settlement, in HUM. RTS. & INT'L TRADE,
supra note 2, at 227.
" Compare TBT Agreement, supra note 75, at Annex 1:4 (defining "international
body or system" as a "[blody or system whose membership is open to the relevant
bodies of at least all Members", which includes inter-governmental or semi-private
bodies), with TBT Agreement, supra note 75, at Annex 1:8 (defining "non-govern-
mental body" as a "[blody other than a central government body or a local govern-
ment body, including a nongovernmental body which has legal power to enforce a
technical regulation.").
82 See SPS Agreement, supra note 74, art. 3.1 ("Members shall base their sanitary
or phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines or recommenda-
tions, where they exist, except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement, and in
particular in paragraph 3." (emphasis added)); see also MISuo MATSUSHITA ET AL,
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE AND POLICY 507-08 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2006).
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3. Incorporation of International Human Rights Considerations and
Interpretation by the DSB
As seen from aforementioned analyses, indicators are either
ambiguous as conceptual indicators or general as standard ones. The
process to incorporate international human rights considerations is to
apply rules or values in this realm to assist understanding WTO rules.
Deep down, this is about interpreting WTO rules and it should be car-
ried out by the authoritative and entitled organs other than individual
countries.
Since "the dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central
element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral
trading system", 3 and it serves to "clarify the existing provisions of
those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation
of public international law", 4 WTO adjudicating bodies therefore
should take responsibilities and are therefore entitled to interpret.
And because the VCLT presents itself as the most effective, authorita-
tive methodology, containing binding norms concerning relevant
treaty issues, 5 it could be deemed as matching the standard regarding"customary rules of interpretation of public international law," and
used as a major tool for interpretation.
As for interpretation, not only adjudicating bodies and the
DSB, but also the Ministerial Conference and the General Council of
the WTO should have the exclusive authority to interpret. However,
adopting interpretations of the WTO Agreement and the Multilateral
Trade Agreements requires a three-fourths majority of Members,"
rendering it difficult to adopt an interpretation. Interpretation by the
83 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uraguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, at
art. 3.2 (1994) [hereinafter DSU], available at http://www.wto.orglenglish/docs-e/
legal-e/28-dsu.pdf.
84 Id. (emphasis added). This is always deemed as manifestation of openness of
the WTO regime or of being a part of the international public law. See Human
Rights and World Trade Agreements: Using General Exception Clauses to Protect
Human Rights, supra note 51 (even deeming it as "mandated"); see also Appellate
Body Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gaso-
line, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter U.S. - Gasoline] (stating that the
WTO law cannot be read in "clinical isolation from public international law").
85 See VCLT, supra note 41. The VCLT is the codification of international custom-
ary in the form of treaty law, it is commonly accepted by the whole international
community, and it is universally followed in the practice of various international
actors, including the dispute settlement procedure of the DSB.
86 See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1144, art. IX:2 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/
legal-e/04-wto.pdf; see also Tim WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAw, PRACTICE AND
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DSB is more time wise and could satisfy practical needs. Therefore,
most interpretive work falls on shoulders of the DSB.
In the scenarios of interpretation, the DSB can determine what
exactly is contained in the agreement, but cannot add or diminish
rights and obligations provided in covered agreements.8 7 That means
the relationship between the WTO and international human rights is
not imaginative or artificially created, but should be realistically
rooted in the agreements.
It is taken for granted that the DSB should clarify the norms in
accordance with its general meaning and context. Yet we cannot draw
a conclusion that the meaning of WTO norms in the WTO is fixed and
settled. Although the DSB has to conform to the norms and "cannot
add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered
agreements," all states, whether under common or civil law systems,
exercise the same discretion as under the WTO regime."8 Justice is
not a zero-sum game. Since norms themselves inevitably and inher-
ently may have weaknesses like ambiguity, limited scope and outdated
regulations, such situations offer the DSB space to expand. Accord-
ingly, the relationship with international law needs to be examined
and adjusted, time and again, in order to reach a point of balance.
B. The WTO and International Human Rights Rules in Conflict
Even though there is no indication in the WTO regime, inter-
national human rights rules and principles may still have a relation-
ship with WTO rules. This is often apparent when examining conflicts
of norms.8 9
Strictly speaking, normative conflicts over when norms are
"both valid and applicable point to incompatible decisions so that a
choice must be made between them."9 ° Considering this, even if there
is no indicator under the WTO regime pointing to international human
rights elements, there can be situations where both international
POLICY, supra note 82, at 13-14 (providing a brief introduction to the procedure of
amendments).
87 DSU, supra note 83, art. 3.2, 19.2.
88 Id. at 3.2.
89 For instance, developing countries' policies are confined by their commitments
under the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) in order to reduce production and trade
distorting while it may conflict with human rights advocated by human rights
treaties as to the right to food. See Caroline Dommen, Raising Human Rights
Concerns in the World Trade Organization: Actors, Processes and Possible Strate-
gies, 24 HUM. RTs. Q. 1, 30-32 (2002) (declaring that the AoA leads to poverty
underlined by human rights treaties like ICESCR).
90 Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of Interna-
tional Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of Interna-
tional Law, supra note 49, at 1.
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human rights and WTO rules impose rights and obligations on the
same country, leading to incompatibility or even contradictions so that
one country has to choose how to perform. This is different from a
situation where the DSB refers to human rights obligations. In that
case, where the DSB is interpreted with assistance from international
human rights regulations and values, there is no real conflicts be-
tween the WTO and international human rights since the two will al-
ways be deemed and treated as harmonious and coherent.
In scenarios where the WTO and international human rights
rules are in conflict, norms in the two areas await application. As
stated by Professor Pauwelyn, there are no explicit conflict clauses in
the WTO regime clarifying the mutual relationship between the WTO
and international human rights.9 1 The maxims lex specialis derogat
legi generali (a superior law suppresses an inferior law) and lex poste-
rior derograt legi prior (a later law overrules an earlier law) point to
application of the prior law.9 2 Correspondingly, these maxims have
been enacted by Article 30 and 56 of the VCLT.9 3
Several questions may be set forth. First and foremost, will
international human rights trump WTO rules most of the time? Be-
cause of their fundamental nature, international human rights norms
seem to be easier to be regarded asjus cogens. Jus cogens are peremp-
tory norms of general international law: legal force that can prevail
over all other norms in the international legal system.94 If interna-
tional human rights norms are treated asjus cogens, they will become
pervasive within the WTO regime and supersede WTO rules without
having on other WTO provisions, the normative hierarchy determined
by the guidance of the VCLT, or other rules addressing conflicts of
norms.9 5 At the same time, there is a risk of abusing international
human rights. As the UN Charter is given priority over other agree-
91 See generally PAUWELYN, supra note 13, at 327-439 (discussing the various con-
flicts which arise between different legal regimes).92 See also Michael Akehurst, The Hierarchy of Sources of International Law, 47
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 273 (1974-75).93 VCLT, supra note 41, arts. 30, 50. Article 30 of the VCLT is titled "Application
of successive treaties relating to the same subject matter" and Article 59 is titled
"Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty implied by conclusion of a
later treaty."94 VCLT, supra note 41, art. 53 (definingjus cogens as an "accepted and recog-
nized by the international community of States as a whole" and its effect as "no
derogation is permitted" and "can be modified only by a subsequent norm of gen-
eral international law having the same character."); VCLT, supra note 41, art. 64
(contemplating the emergence of a new peremptory norm); see also, Robert Jen-
nings & Arthur Watts, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 8-9 (9th ed.1996).
95 The underlying reason is because there is no customary practice in the WTO
regime. For debates on this issue, see PAUWELYN, supra note 13, at 47-50.
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ments in case of conflicts, human rights norms can be deemed as jus
cogens as part of the UN Charter. 6 There may also be rules that are
universally admitted but whose content the whole international com-
munity may not be able to reach a consensus on. No matter what stan-
dards are to determine jus cogens as international human rights
principles, they must be specific and it would be better for the interna-
tional community to establish some authoritative institutions other
than the DSB to take charge of the issue.9" Only in this way can the
relationship between the WTO and human rights principles be well
addressed to avoid the collapse of the rule of law under the WTO
regime.
Secondly, countries today give preference to regional trade
agreements (RTAs) or bilateral trade agreements (BTAs).9 s Because
political forces are more influential on a bilateral or regional basis, in
these situations, international human rights clauses are more likely to
be included as preconditions for performance of trade obligations. At
the same time, there are more possibilities that economic sanctions are
used as punishment for failure to protect human rights. Since the
WTO has recently pushed to liberalize RTAs and BTAs as part of the
negotiations process, the number of such arrangements will increase.
How are conflicts between these rules appropriately addressed? RTAs
and BTAs practices may be legitimized by both the WTO and interna-
tional human rights institutions. At the same time, express authoriza-
tion may function as a facade for intervention with the other party's
interior affairs or deliberate deviation from WTO obligations. Conse-
quently, such authorization could be destructive to the rule-oriented
WTO framework. On its face, the law may offend the parties' intent,
being hard to determine, and substantially fall short of the "consent"
element of a valid agreement. Accordingly, the party probably ought
not follow the spirit requested by pacta sunt servanda (agreements
must be kept) and pacta dant legem contractui (stipulations of parties
constitute the law of the contract). In sum, these situations call for the
DSB to adopt cautious methods in order to suitably cope with the rela-
tionship between the WTO and international human rights.
96 U.N. Charter, supra note 6, art. 103 ("In the event of a conflict between the
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and
their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under
the present Charter shall prevail.").
97 Ruiz-Fabri, Commentaire sur l'article 66 de la Convention de Vienne, in Corten
and Klein (eds), LES CONVENTIONS DE VIENNE SUR LE DROIT DES TRAIT9S DE 1969 ET
1986: COMMENTAIRE ARTICLE PAR ARTICLE (forthcoming); Cosnard, Commentaires
sur l'article 65 de la Convention de Vienne, id. (quoted by Marceau, supra note 50,
at 800-01).
98 See generally Sungjoon Cho, Defragmenting World Trade, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 39 (2006).
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V. REFLECTION UPON THE ISSUE OF THE RELATIONSHIP
AND GLOBALIZATION
A. Jurisdictions of International Institutions and Their Cooperation
Because of the sensitive nature of economic issues and the
growing intrusiveness of trade rules, the relationship with interna-
tional human rights is increasingly discussed under the WTO regime.
Emphasizing the priority of human rights obligations can be legiti-
mately useful to alleviate the adverse influence by the ex parte trade
considerations. On the other hand, there is a risk that international
human rights may be taken advantage of by trade protectionists.
From the perspective of the WTO, if a state attempts to defend
international human rights obligations or benefits, the appropriate
way is to leave the final deciding power in hands of the DSB. Because
the DSB has compulsory jurisdictions upon issues relevant to the
rights and responsibilities under the WTO regime, any disputes perti-
nent to the WTO rules should be under its control.9 9 It acts as a quasi-
judicative organ in the WTO framework, which distinguishes the WTO
from a lot of other international institutions and guarantees the rule of
law. In this forum, the issue concerning the relationship with interna-
tional human rights values or rules can be objectively examined and
its factual decision-making function can even expand the WTO rules if
it finds necessary.1 0 0
However, from another perspective, most international human
rights treaties respectively or collectively have tribunals and courts. 10 1
99 DSU, supra note 83, art. 23.1 (providing that "[w]hen members seek the redress
of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under
the covered agreement or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the
covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules of proce-
dures of this Understanding."); see also DSU, supra note 83, art. 23.2(a) ("[Mem-
bers shall] not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred,
that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objec-
tive of the covered agreement has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute
settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding ... "
(emphasis added)); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND IN-
TERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 313 (2d ed. 1997); United States - Section
301-303 of the Trade Act of 1947, Panel Report, WT/DS152/R, 313 (Dec. 22, 1999).
'00 See generally Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights,
13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 753 (2002) (analyzing how reconcilable and irreconcilable con-
flicts between a WTO provision and human rights law should be resolved by WTO
adjudicating bodies and the DSB).
101 Examples that could be named: United Human Rights Committee (HRC)
which handles alleged violation of the ICCPR; the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination Committees (CERD Committees) on the ba-
sis of CERD, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or De-
grading Treatment Committees (CAT Committees) on the basis of CAT,
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The jurisdictions of international or regional institutions are always
explicit, because members often agree to bring their cases relevant to
tribunals when signing agreements before real disputes occur. How-
ever, as opposed to the WTO, international or regional human rights
tribunals commonly have non-exclusive jurisdictions. 1 2 Therefore, in
these circumstances, members can still file their cases with the WTO.
Interpretation of international human rights norms by a special
human rights institution may not coincide with the WTO's interpreta-
tion in each instance and conflicts are likely to emerge.
Since effective rules for jurisdictional distribution and coordi-
nation have not been well established, it is imperative for concerned
organizations or states to cooperate. Only in this way can consensus
on the customary practices of jurisdictional coordination be gradually
formed in the international community.
B. Handling the Relationship with the Rule of Law
As demonstrated by the analysis above, the relationship be-
tween international human rights and the WTO is not imaginary.
Most situations stem from WTO's normative basis. Similarly, any in-
corporation of international human rights rules into the WTO regime
or even conflicts between them should and could be addressed by
strictly following general rules of public international law.' 0 3
However, we cannot deny that in the practice there are cases
where one state unilaterally breaches an agreement for human rights'
reasons. For example, a Member may refuse to perform its obligations
under the WTO regime, although the excuse regarding international
human rights duties is determined to be unreasonable by the DSB.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW Committees) on the basis of CEDAW, and Convention on the Protection
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (MWC) on the
basis of more specialized UN human rights procedures.
102 Yuval Shany, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 195-200 (2003). But see id. at 188-91 (identifying the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (ECHR) as an exception).
103 The rule of law at the very beginning is a stern concept that is supposed to be
carried out by people against governmental arbitrariness and irrationality. When
first created, it was to mean that "no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to
suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordi-
nary legal manner before the ordinary Courts of the land," which emphasizes the
guarding role of the court. See A.V. DIcEY, LECTURES INTRODUCTORY TO THE STUDY
OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 117 (1st ed. 1885). For a more specific discus-
sion about proliferation of the rule of law on the international plane, see Simon
Chesterman, An International Rule of Law? New York University Public Law and
Legal Theory Working Papers (2008), available at http://lsr.nellco.orgcgi/view
content.cgi?article=1070&context=nyu/plltwp (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
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These are abnormal situations, which reflect one traditional way of
thinking, one that underlines the inviolability of state sovereignty.
There are an abundant number of cases under the WTO show-
ing that one party may prefer to receive retaliation upon breach, be-
cause it may benefit more from breach of agreements than from the
implementation of unfavorable decisions by the WTO panels, espe-
cially where the economic strength of the breaching party is far beyond
that of its rivals. 10 4 For this reason, quelling hegemony can be diffi-
cult. Reforming the WTO and other international organizations has
far to go.
Admittedly, the frequency of occurrence of unilateral activities
has decreased. Represented by the WTO, international law, especially
in the economic area, is regularly modified. With international organi-
zations constantly reforming their rules, international law has been
gradually supplemented and reinforced. We can no longer blame in-
ternational law as useless "soft" law.
VI. CONCLUSION
Through in-depth analysis of the relationship between interna-
tional human rights and the WTO, we find that seemingly disparate
areas actually have manifold links. The connection could be explicitly
rooted in and indicated by WTO rules. It can also arise because of
conflict between the responsibilities and rights assumed by con-
tracting parties. In the process of globalization, various matters are
more likely to be intertwined.
Through establishment of international organizations, interna-
tional rules have gradually become more binding. The theory of con-
stitutionalism promoted recently by international institutions
expedites the inclusion of international laws in domestic ones.'0" This
is mirrored in the ascending status of judicial organs and their impor-
tance. Considering all the elements above, the belief in the rule of law
104 Hu Wei, Editorial, The Reconstruction of A Retaliation System Under WTO, 9
INT. TRADE L. & REG. 31, 31-32 (2003).105 On the European Continent, earlier scholars like Hermann Mosler, Wilhelm
Wengler and Christian Tomuschat lay the theoretical foundation for constitution-
alism discussion. See Armin Von Bangdandy, Law and Politics in the WTO: Strat-
egy to Copy with a Deficient Relationship, 5 Max Planck Yearbook of United
Nations Law 609, 613 (2001). Later, students such as Armin Von Bangdady and
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann elaborate further on this topic and raise some more con-
structive ideas. Among them, Professor Petersmann believes in Multilevel Consti-
tutionalism, which requires the constitutionalism both in international
organizations (treaty constitutionalism) and in each country. See Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, The Change Structure of International Economic law, Address at the
Xiamen Academy of International Law (Sept. 2006) (on file with author).
426 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 8:3
is formed on the international plane. The relationship between WTO
norms and international human rights values or rules should be ra-
tionally shaped by the rule of law and can only be soundly addressed in
accordance with the rule of law in the context of globalization.
